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INTRODUCTION
The welfare and destiny of the United States depend on the con-
tinued success of the nation's fundamental premise that competitive
enterprise promotes prosperity and progress.' An American tradi-
tion exists that economic growth occurs through the initiative, crea-
tive talent, and venture capital employed by private entrepreneurs
in developing new technologies.2 In return, individuals who risk
such investments become the beneficiaries of the fruits of competi-
tive enterprise.3 The concept of protecting intellectual property
rights is an integral part of this American tradition.
4
The United States Constitution provides intellectual property
1. See S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, A New Approach to Evaluation of the American Patent Sys-
tem, 33 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 555, 555 (1951) (discussing historical premises of
patent system and interdependence between patent system and private competitive enterprise
tradition in United States). See generally GORDON C. BjORK, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBUC
INTEREST. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CAPrALISM (1969) (providing history of develop-
ment of American economic system as free enterprise system).
2. See Oppenheim, supra note 1, at 555 (asserting that traditions of private competitive
enterprise represent "the main catalyst of incentive" to seek rewards through risk-taking in
expenditure of labor, capital, and other entrepreneurial resources); see also Eugene S. Fergu-
son, History and Histiography, in YANKEE ENTERPRISE: THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
MANUFACTURES 11 (Otto Mayr & Robert C. Post eds., 1981) (describing American tradition
established in 1800s of private entrepreneurs seizing economic opportunity with "missionary
zeal").
3. See ROBERT A. CHOATE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW INCLUDING
TRADE SECRETS - COPYRIGHTS - TRADEMARKS 72-73 (3d ed. 1987) (quoting NATIONAL PATENT
PLANNING COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT 783-84 (1943)) (stating that American people recognize
"fundamental rightness and fairness" of rewarding investments of inventiveness and
creativity).
4. See CHOATE ET AL., supra note 3, at 72 (maintaining that American patent system is
"the only provision of government for the promotion of invention and discovery and is the
basis upon which our entire industrial civilization rests"); Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival
of Confidence in the Patent System, 73J. PAT. [&c TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 5, 5 (1991) (commenting
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protection to authors and inventors.5 The issuance of a patent by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) confers upon
an inventor a legally recognized property interest in the patented
invention.6 For a limited time, the patent owner receives a legal
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented
invention within the United States.
7
Broad legal remedies provided under title 35 of the United States
Code protect patent owners against violations, or infringements, of
their rights.8 In addition, parties involved in patent disputes can
seek declaratory judgments to establish their legal rights and re-
sponsibilities. 9 Unlike infringement suits that seek available reme-
dies under patent statutes, however, declaratory judgment actions
do not require the actual commission of an allegedly infringing
act.' 0 Declaratory judgments enable parties to litigate patent dis-
that patent system "has always been an integral part of the social and economic fabric of this
nation").
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The United States Constitution provides that Congress
shall have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." ld; see also CHOATE ET AL., supra note 3, at 69 (noting absence of record of any
legislative debate on Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 suggests that provision was not controver-
sial at time it was enacted).
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (providing in pertinent part that "(e]very patent shall
contain ... a grant to the patentee, his [or her] heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen
years ... of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention through-
out the United States"). The term "patentee" refers not only to the party or parties to whom
the patent is issued but also to successors in title. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1988). A patentee can
therefore represent the inventor(s) or any assignee(s) of the patent. Id. For simplicity and
consistency, however, the term "patent owner" will be used exclusively hereinafter when re-
ferring to the holder of legal title to a patent or a party with standing to litigate matters
concerning the patent.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). To obtain a patent, a patent owner must demonstrate the
development of a new, useful, and nonobvious process or product. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-105
(1988). This demonstration is made through a patent application, which contains a specifica-
tion describing how the invention works. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988). The specification, in turn,
consists of claims that point out the advances the invention brings to a field beyond the cur-
rent state of the art. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). Once granted by the PTO, a patent cannot be
renewed. See ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAvIs, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL § 1.2, at 12 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that upon
expiration of patent grant term, invention enters public domain for manufacture, use, or sale
by all).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988) (providing that patent owner "shall have remedy by civil
action for infringement of his [or her] patent"). The remedies available to a patent owner
upon a finding of infringement include injunctive relief and an award of compensatory dam-
ages no less than a reasonable royalty. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (1988). Furthermore, when a
court deems it appropriate, such as upon a finding of willful infringement, a court can in-
crease the award up to three times the amount of actual damages. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). A
court also has discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in excep-
tional cases. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988).
9. See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988) (providing that ac-
tions for declaratory judgment are governed by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure). Rule 57 states, "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a
judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
10. See Jerry D. Voight, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases Where There Has Been No
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putes even in prospective infringement situations, where nothing
more than a potential exists for infringement in the future."
Patent infringement litigants are initiating declaratory judgment
actions with increasing frequency.' 2 The traditional use of this pro-
ceeding involves an action by the manufacturer of a potentially in-
fringing product against the patent owner to have the patent
declared invalid, or alternatively, to have the product declared non-
infringing.1 3 A recent extension of this traditional application is the
converse use of declaratory judgment actions by patent owners
against manufacturers of potentially infringing products. 14 The re-
cent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (Federal Circuit) in Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co. 15 high-
lights the emergence of this novel jurisprudence.
16
Because patent owners already possess substantive statutory
remedies for actual patent infringement,' 7 the availability of a
declaratory judgment option provides owners an additional, purely
procedural remedy of startling potential impact.' 8 Declaratory
Act ofInfringement, 72J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 1136, 1141 (1990) (reviewing case law
in which declaratory judgments have been sought by either alleged infringers or patent own-
ers to resolve disputes prior to commission of any act that would constitute patent
infringement).
11. See id (stating that actual infringing activity need not have occurred for declaratory
relief to be sought).
12. See Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 592, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 331, 336 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (noting that most common and appropriate use of declaratory judgment is in pat-
ent infringement cases); Windm~ller v. Laguerre, 284 F. Supp. 563, 564 (D.D.C. 1968) (dis-
cussing modem trend to recognize utility of declaratory judgment action in patent matters);
see also 1OA CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2761, at 669 &
n.1 (2d ed. 1983) (recognizing that declaratory judgment actions are frequently brought in
matters involving patents).
13. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2761, at 671 & n.4 (stating that declaratory
judgment actions in patent field are most commonly brought by alleged infringers seeking
declaration of non-infringement, or invalidity, or both).
14. See 6 DONALD S. CHisuM, PATENTs: A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTABILITY, VALID-
rrY AND INFRINGEMENT § 21.02[I][D], at 21-48 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (discussing cases that
extend declaratory judgment remedy to patent owners); Voight, supra note 10, at 1156 (re-
viewing suits by patent owners to have patents declared valid and prospectively infringed).
15. 895 F.2d 761, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
16. See infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text (examining development ofjurispru-
dence that recognizes propriety of declaratory judgment use by patent owners, beginning
with 1963 decision of Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 223 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. Tx.
1963), aft'don reh'g, 225 F. Supp. 412, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 375 (S.D. Tex. 1964), and culmi-
nating with 1990 Federal Circuit decision of Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d
761, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988) (providing that unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale
of any patented invention within United States during term of patent constitutes actual in-
fringement); 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-284 (1988) (discussing legal remedies available to patent
owner upon finding of actual infringement).
18. See 1OA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2751, at 569 (stating that availability of de-
claratory judgment remedy expands judicial discretion and makes judicial process "more
pliant and malleable"); see also Swedlow, Inc. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 455 F.2d 884, 885-86, 172
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1972) (rejecting use of declaratory judgment by patent
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judgment dramatically broadens the scope of liability beyond actual
infringing conduct to include activity that might lead to infringe-
ment in the future (prospective infringement).1 9 Therefore, the
availability of declaratory relief to patent owners significantly
strengthens existing patent rights.
20
The expansion of patent owners' rights through the use of declar-
atory judgment reflects ajudicial trend toward increased patent pro-
tection. 21 This judicial trend is a significant aspect of a deliberate
effort by the United States to strengthen intellectual property rights
in the hope of promoting and protecting domestic technological in-
novations, thereby preserving American competitiveness in the
world marketplace.
22
Part I of this Comment discusses the rationale for intellectual
property protection through patents. In addition, this section re-
views efforts by the United States Government to increase domestic
intellectual property protection in response to contemporary dy-
namics in the world technology marketplace. Part I][ presents the
rationale for the statutory remedy of declaratory judgment. In par-
ticular, this section provides an overview of the traditional applica-
tion of declaratory judgment relief to patent law in the context of
suits brought by manufacturers of allegedly infringing products
against patent owners. Part III analyzes the emerging use of declar-
atory judgment relief in the opposite context of suits brought by
patent owners against prospective infringers. This section con-
cludes with an analysis of the recent Federal Circuit decision, Lang v.
Pacific Marine & Supply Co.,23 and its impact on patent law. The goal
owners because of fear that Declaratory Judgment Act would give patent owner "broader
substantive rights than are available under the Patent Statutes"). For a detailed analysis of
Swedlow, see infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
19. See Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.q,2d (BNA)
1820, 1823 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (establishing propriety of declaratory judgment use by patent
owners against manufacturers presently engaged in activities that would likely result in future
patent infringement). For a detailed analysis of Lang, see infra notes 121-52 and accompany-
ing text.
20. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing judicial controversy regard-
ing granting of additional remedy to patent owners stemming from fear of unduly expanding
existing patent rights).
21. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (examining impact of 1982 creation of
Federal Circuit on judiciary in increasing scope and protection of patent owners' rights); see
also Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversamy Look at Its Impact
on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 1087, 1092 (1988) (commenting that height-
ened patent protection in Federal Circuit reflects broad judicial movement toward greater
protection of technological development and innovation).
22. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (considering decline of American eco-
nomic and technological status in world market and concerted response by executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches of United States Government to maintain competitiveness by
strengthening intellectual property protections).
23. 895 F.2d 761, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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of this Comment is to introduce the reader to a significant develop-
ment in patent law jurisprudence. Although declaratory judgment
has been common in patent infringement litigation, its use until re-
cently has been limited to actions by alleged infringers against pat-
ent owners.2
4
In accordance with its general purpose, declaratory judgment
provides an alleged infringer with the benefit of an expedient and
economical resolution to matters in dispute.25 When specifically ap-
plied to suits by patent owners, however, declaratory judgment
causes a major expansion of existing patent rights by providing a
patent owner with the previously unavailable option of a preemptive
strike against prospective infringers. 26 The undesirable effect of
such expansion is the subversion of the fundamental public policy
premise for the patent system, which is the encouragement of the
widest possible dissemination of technology, in favor of the private
financial interests of patent entrepreneurs.
The modem demand for increased intellectual property protec-
tion to preserve American economic and technological competitive-
ness in the world marketplace has motivated judicial acceptance of
declaratory judgment use by patent owners against manufacturers
of potentially infringing products.27 Judicial actions that ensure the
protection of a patent owner's legally recognized interest encourage
future investment in technological innovation by sending a clear
message that a patent is a valuable and powerful property right.28
Courts must be careful, however, to balance contemporary anxieties
over the preservation of American economic competitiveness with
the reality that overaggressive patent protection impedes the crea-
tion of new technologies that the patent system was originally
designed to stimulate.
24. See generally Voight, supra note 10, at 1156 (discussing traditional patent law applica-
tion of declaratory judgment to suits by alleged infringers and recent evolution in jurispru-
dence that recognizes use of declaratory judgment by patent owners against prospective
infringers).
25. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2761, at 673 (proposing that availability of
declaratory judgment to alleged infringer protects against threat of infringement suit by pat-
ent owner through prompt dispositive procedure).
26. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (examining impact of Federal Circuit's de-
cision in Lang, which significantly broadens patent rights by allowing patent owners to prevent
certain preliminary business activities by competitors that do not constitute infringement
under any existing patent law).
27. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (addressing Federal Circuit decision in
Lang as part ofjudicial trend to safeguard intellectual property, which in turn represents part
of deliberate government effort to stimulate American creative and financial investment in
technology).
28. See infra note 50 and accompanying text (considering public faith in merits of tech-
nology investment garnered by judicial decisions that favor patent owners).
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I. THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM
A. Introduction
Protection of intellectual property has been a principle inherent
in the American spirit since the inception of this nation.29 The pat-
ent system is an embodiment of the traditional belief that progress
and prosperity are best achieved through free enterprise.30 The
purpose of the American patent system is to promote technological
innovation by providing economic incentives to inventors and their
supporters. 31 The patent system continually evolves in response to
the economic and social pressures of the country.3 2 The nation's
economic prosperity is intimately linked with its attitude toward in-
29. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THE MODERN ECONOMY I
(Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter PATENT SYSTEM & MODERN ECONOMY] (declaring that history
of American patent system spans growth of nation). See generally MILLER & DAvis, supra note 7,
at 4-9 (reviewing origins and development of United States patent law).
30. See I ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III, LIPScoMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:8, at 54 (3d ed.
1984) (professing that patents are "potent force" in competitive free enterprise system). Pat-
ent law is designed to foster competition among inventors by awarding a patent to the "inge-
nious individual who wins in a race for discovery." Id. at 54. In addition to inventors, patent
assignees, employing firms, and financial supporters also participate in the competition. Id.
The emergence of a new patented product on the market stimulates all concerned in the trade
to develop a competitive product. Id. The patent system therefore enhances overall eco-
nomic effort by provoking both existing firms seeking to remain competitive and new busi-
nesses attempting to enter the market to invent progressive, competitive technologies.
PATENT SYSTEM & MODERN ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 1.
31. See Oppenheim, supra note 1, at 555 (asserting that patent system offers possibility of
financial reward to inventors and inventors' supporters). The prospect of financial reward
encourages the expenditure of time and private risk capital in research and development ef-
forts. Id. at 556. The patent system also stimulates the investment of additional capital
needed for the further refinement and marketing of an invention. Id.; see also CHOATE ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 73 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, REPORT OF PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION 76 (1966)) (stating that affording patent protection to inventors speeds
public disclosure of technological information that might otherwise remain secret). Early dis-
closure of information reduces the likelihood that efforts will be duplicated by others and
provides a foundation for further advances in the technological field involved. CHOATE ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 73. Furthermore, the patent system stimulates the beneficial exchange of
products, services, and technological information across national boundaries by protecting
the industrial property of foreign nationals. Id. But see Paula Dwyer, The Battle Raging over
'Intellectual Property', Bus. WK., May 22, 1989, at 78 (reporting United States Department of
Justice policy in 1950s of bringing antitrust suits against companies that aggressively enforced
their patents). At constant tension with the economic premise supporting patent protection
are basic antitrust concerns coupled with fears of retarding the dissemination of beneficial
technological advances. Id. at 78.
An alternate justification for the patent system lies in the doctrine of natural rights. MILLER
& DAVIS, supra note 7, § 1.3, at 15. Under this theory, the "product of mental labor is by
natural right the property of the person who created it." Id. This right always vested with the
inventor in the past and therefore existed long before the passage of statutory law. Id. The
federal patent statutes simply secured an exclusive intellectual property right to the patent
owner. CHOATE Er AL., supra note 3, at 70. From the perspective of this Comment, however,
the natural rights rationale for patent protection is of more anecdotal than present practical
significance.
32. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 5 (commenting on dependence of patent system on
public attitudes).
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tellectual property.33
B. Historical Perspective of Intellectual Property Protection
in the United States
During the second half of the 19th century, the United States
progressed through the Industrial Revolution.34 This period of
unbridled laissez-faire economics furthered Americans' appreciation
of a strong patent system.3 5 From the turn of the century until the
1970s, however, the United States dominated the world economic
market, and the existence and enforcement of intellectual property
rights seemed less important.3 6 Throughout this time period, a
pervasive antitrust sentiment permeated American public policy and
dictated the practices and attitudes of all branches of the Federal
Government.3 7 As a result, the temporary right of exclusivity
granted by the patent system fell into disfavor.
38
The latter part of the 1970s saw an end to this period, as the
American public awoke to the reality of the nation's appalling de-
cline in world economic and technological stature. 39 This precipi-
33. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, In the Marketplace of Ideas, Americans Ask for Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1988, § 4, at 24 (reporting on relationship between American economy and
intellectual property and growing dissatisfaction with patent protection).
34. See Dwyer, supra note 31, at 78 (characterizing Congress' efforts in 1800s as strength-
ening patent and copyright laws, thereby helping to bring about Industrial Revolution in
United States).
35. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 6 (reviewing historical background of intellectual prop-
erty law and stating that Industrial Revolution increased role of patent protection).
36. See Dwyer, supra note 31, at 78 (describing disinterest in intellectual property rights
during 1950s in wake of dominance of world market by United States).
37. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 6 (describing passage of Sherman Act in 1890 as begin-
ning of era of antitrust suppression of patent system).
38. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 6 (noting decline of patent system in wake of decisions
in antitrust cases that reflected courts' concerns regarding restraint of competition).
Although once disfavorably viewed as temporary monopolies, patents have gained consid-
erable respect in recent years. See CHOATE Er AL., supra note 3, at 71 (stating that modem
trend recognizes that patent privilege differs from "odious monopoly" in that it does not
deprive public of existing right but rather delays exercise by others of new direction marked
out by patent owner); Kastriner, supra note 4, at 7 (describing public policy toward patent
system as fraught with antitrust, antimonopoly concerns until mid-1970s). This temporary
right of exclusivity provides an opportunity for patent owners to receive a fair return on their
investments in labor and capital. CHOATE ET AL., supra note 3, at 71. The current climate of
antitrust enforcement, therefore, represents a dramatic shift away from that existing before
the 1970s. Kastriner, supra note 4, at 7; see also Roger B. Andewelt, Antitrust Perspective on
Intellectual Property Protection, Remarks to the American Bar Association (July 16, 1985),
reprinted in 30 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 319, 319 (1985) (reporting that Antitrust
Division of Department ofJustice favors expansion of intellectual property protection).
39. See I THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUS. COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL
COMPETITION: THE NEW REALITY 5, 8-19 (1985) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON INDUS-
TRIAL COMPETITIVENESS] (providing extensive review of economy and reporting on alarmingly
deficient expenditure of funds on research and development). In 1985, the President's Com-
mission on Industrial Competitiveness, which was charged with assessing the relative position
of the United States in the world marketplace, presented compelling evidence that the eco-
nomic competitiveness of the United States had declined. Id. at 8-19.
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tous decline shocked the national consciousness. The United
States, which had led the rest of the world into the modem era
through mass production and technological advances, no longer
possessed global economic superiority.40
C. The Current Climate of Intellectual Praperty Protection in the United
States
In response to the United States loss of its once formidable lead
in world markets, the Federal Government initiated substantive
measures to analyze the causation of these market shifts and to im-
prove the nation's economic competitiveness. 41 The relationships
between intellectual property protection, investment, manufacture,
and trade inevitably brought global significance to the concept of
intellectual property protection because markets had become in-
creasingly globalized. 42 Through the government's attempts to un-
derstand the interaction of these factors, the American public
became aware that nurturing all domestic intellectual property re-
sources is vital to the economic well-being of the nation and to its
ability to compete effectively in the world marketplace. 43
With current estimated annual losses of 250,000 jobs and $80 bil-
lion in revenue to domestic and international intellectual property
piracy, increasing effective intellectual property protection became a
40. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing decline of United States in economic and
technological world markets and resultant effect on American self-image); see also JOHN AG-
NEW, THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD-ECONOMY: A REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY 1, 20 (1987)
(stating that "America's impasse" is public resistance to accepting notion that United States is
merely one part of world's economy because of inability to overcome pre-1970s ideology of
"national exceptionalism"-belief that what is good for United States is good for world).
41. See NancyJ. Perry, The Surprising New Power of Patents, FORTUNE, June 23, 1986, at 57
(stating that as result of United States decline in world markets, all three branches of Federal
Government initiated reforms, which included creation of Court of Appeals for Federal
Circuit).
42. See Otto A. Stamm, GATI Negotiations for the Protection of New Technologies, 73J. PAT. [&
TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 680, 682 (1991) (discussing effect of current globalization of markets
and nations' economic interdependence on trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights); Thomas McCarroll, Creativity - Whose Bright Idea?, TIME, June 10, 1991, at 45 (asserting
that "as global enterprise relies less on physical materials and more on human creativity,
reliable intellectual property will become central to world commerce").
43. See Dwyer, supra note 31, at 78 (stating that foreign competition in world markets has
heightened societal awareness of importance of intellectual property rights and has resulted
in legislative efforts to create more rigorous protection). The increasing importance of intel-
lectual property becomes apparent upon recognition that intellectual property now accounts
for more than 25% of United States exports, as compared with just 12% eight years ago.
McCarroll, supra note 42, at 45; see also Terry L. Clark, The Future of Patent-Based Investigations
Under Section 337 After the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1149,
1151 (1989) (stating that "increased technological development directly contributes to eco-
nomic growth by increasing productivity and by providing new and improved products and
processes to meet new and previously unmet needs").
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mandate.44 Furthermore, a cry of economic necessity arose to in-
crease the incentive to invest, especially to invest in the long, costly,
and uncertain process of innovation. 45 Eventually, economic plan-
ners realized that the American patent system had always been
designed to, and was inherently capable of, accomplishing both
these objectives. 46 In a rare display of cooperation, all three
branches of the United States Government commenced along a path
toward increased intellectual property protection through the
strengthening of patent rights.47
44. See McCarroll, supra note 42, at 44 (examining intellectual property piracy and resul-
tant annual costs to United States businesses).
45. See AGNEW, supra note 40, at 141 (citing Joseph A. McKinney & Keith A. Rowley,
Trends in U.S. High Technology Trade, 20 COLUM. J. WoRLD Bus. 69-81 (1985)) (stating that
technical innovation plays important role in fostering increased productivity and stimulating
long-term economic growth); Kastriner, supra note 4, at 7 (describing public acceptance of
nation's economic decline and awareness that industrial creativity had to be stimulated).
46. See AGNEW, supra note 40, at 20 (explaining emergence of new perspective on patent
system).
47. See AGNEW, supra note 40, at 14 (presenting new government attitudes toward in-
creasing intellectual property protection in deliberate effort to improve nation's economic
competitiveness); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 27 (1989) (describing major reorientation in last decade of national compet-
itive policy and increased appreciation of role of high technology in nation's economy as evi-
denced by relaxed antitrust enforcement policy, federal laws that encourage private research
and development projects, and Supreme Court's new sympathy toward state protection of
intellectual property).
During the 1980s the executive branch proposed a series of patent-related legislative initia-
tives, most of which Congress enacted into law. See Dwyer, supra note 31, at 78 (reporting that
since 1983, Congress has quietly passed 14 laws strengthening intellectual property rights).
Protection against international intellectual property piracy ranks high on President Bush's
trade agenda. See Report Outlines President's Agenda and Review of U.S. Trade Policy, Bus. Am., Mar.
26, 1990, at 8 (discussing 1990 Trade Policy Agenda and 1989 Annual Report of President of
United States on Trade Agreements Program). Through negotiations at the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) conference and subsequent actions
by the United States Trade Representative, the executive branch exerted its influence on for-
eign countries to strengthen their respective national intellectual property laws in order to
provide improved protection in foreign countries for owners of American patents, trade
secrets, and copyrights. Id at 8-10; see McCarroll, supra note 42, at 44 (describing pressure
placed by United States on foreign governments through threats of trade regulations in at-
tempt to stem piracy of American intellectual property abroad).
The contributions of the legislative branch have been no less impressive. See Unreal Estate,
ECONOMIsT, Dec. 23, 1989, at 100 (reporting that America's legislators are enacting laws that
afford greater rights to owners of ideas). With support from the executive branch, Congress
passed several important pieces of patent legislation that strengthened intellectual property
protection and enhanced a patent owner's ability to reap the rewards intended to accompany
patent ownership. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 8 (reviewing legislative actions that increase
scope and strength of patent rights). One example is the promulgation of the Process Patent
Amendment Act of 1988, which extended the definition of infringement to include products
manufactured in a foreign country by processes patented in the United States. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (g) (1988) (defining infringer as one who uses or sells products manufactured in United
States or in foreign country using process patented in United States). A second example of
increased legislative vigilance is section 337 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, which empowered the United States Customs Service to exclude the entry of prod-
ucts suspected of infringing domestic intellectual property rights. Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 337, 102 Stat. 1107, 1107 (codified as
amended in 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (1988)); see Unreal Estate, supra, at 100 (reporting that section
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In particular, judicial attitudes toward the patent system under-
went a remarkable evolution during the last decade. 48 The creation
of the Federal Circuit in 1982 provided uniform and reliable inter-
pretation of the patent laws and today represents the most impor-
tant governmental response to concerns about the status of
domestic intellectual property protection. 49 The Federal Circuit not
337 of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act is probably toughest of new intellectual
property laws). For these legislative protections to have a substantial impact, however, judi-
cial enforcement is necessary.
The Federal Circuit initiated much of this change with its reinterpretation of the law in the
areas of patent validity and non-obviousness, which expanded patent rights. See Kastriner,
supra note 4, at 10-12 (elaborating on Federal Circuit's enforcement of presumption of valid-
ity and increase in objectivity of "secondary consideration" analysis, which considers such
factors as commercial success, unmet, long-felt needs, and failure of others to solve problem
as potentially probative and revealing evidence). Such Federal Circuit reinterpretations of
patent laws have resulted in pro-patent owner biases. Kastriner, supra note 4, at 13. These
expanded rights were further strengthened through the Federal Circuit's liberal imposition of
economic deterrents to infringement in the form of injunctive relief and considerable damage
awards. See William A. Morrison, Note, The Impact of the Creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit on the Availability of Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Patent Infringement, 23 IND.
L. REv. 169, 187 (1991) (concluding that availability of preliminary injunctive relief against
patent infringement has increased since creation of Federal Circuit). Prior to the existence of
the Federal Circuit, courts granted 36% of the motions for preliminary injunction made in
patent disputes. Id at 187. The Federal Circuit has since granted 52% of the preliminary
injunctions sought. Id; see also Gary M. Ropski & Marc S. Cooperman, Damages in USA Intellec-
tual Property Litigation, 72 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 181, 182 (rioting that Federal
Circuit's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent field has resulted in more frequent in-
junctions and larger awards to patent owners). The federal district courts have followed the
Federal Circuit's lead. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 9 (revealing that uniformity in patent
litigation is result of federal district courts conforming to Federal Circuit's interpretation of
patent laws). Perhaps the most significant aspect of this transformation is increased judicial
willingness to grant injunctions to patent owners immediately upon success at trial. This dif-
fers dramatically from the traditional procedure of staying an injunction until after the in-
fringer exhausts all appeals. Kastriner, supra note 4, at 10. Furthermore, prior to trial, district
courts now grant preliminary injunctions, which courts traditionally disfavored and rarely
granted. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 10 (describing growing federal district court approval
of preliminary injunctions).
48. See Kastriner, supra note 4, at 10 (characterizing fundamental changes in judicial atti-
tude toward patent system).
49. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988)) (establishing Federal Circuit). The Federal Cir-
cuit is an Article III court at the same level as the existing United States courts of appeals. S.
REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,'12. The
Federal Circuit represents the merger of the United States Court of Claims and the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25, 25 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(1988)). The Federal Circuit adopted the decisions of the Court of Claims and CCPA as
precedent. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370, 215 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 657,
657 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (in banc) (recognizing holdings of predecessors, Court of Claims and
CCPA). The legislative history on the Federal Courts Improvement Act explains the Federal
Circuit's purpose as follows:
The United States Congress created the Federal Circuit to fill a void in the judicial
system by creating an appellate forum capable of exercising nationwide jurisdiction
over appeals in areas of the law where Congress determines there is a special need
for nationwide uniformity [and] to improve the administration of the patent law by
centralizing appeals in patent cases.
S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12.
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only succeeded in producing judicial consistency in patent interpre-
tations, but also created, however unconsciously, unprecedented
public confidence in the security of patents. 50 The recognition of
declaratory judgment use by patent owners in infringement litiga-
tion exemplifies the trend toward increased intellectual property
protection.
II. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT RELIEF
A. Introduction
The value of any legal right plainly depends on the strength of the
means designed to protect that right.5 ' The legitimacy of the patent
system, therefore, depends on the practical scope and effectiveness
of available means of enforcing the legal rights conferred to patent
owners. 52 In addition to substantive legal remedies, patent owners
now possess the procedural remedy of declaratory judgment.53
The general purpose of declaratory judgment is to promote the
50. See Alexander E. Silverman, Intellectual Property Law and the Venture Capitalist Process, 5
HIGH TECH. LJ. 157, 161 (1989) (stating that creation of Federal Circuit has increased power
of patents); Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 17-20 (1989) (describing Federal Circuit's sensitivity to
patent policy and resulting pro-patent owner stance in substantive issues as well as improved
availability of remedies and preliminary injunctive relief); see also Donald R. Dunner, Special
Committee on CAFC, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. REP. 314, 325 (report-
ing that from 1982 through 1987, Federal Circuit upheld 89%o of district court decisions of
patent validity). Circuit court decisions prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit upheld
only 30%o of district court decisions of patent validity. Id. at 324. Furthermore, from 1982 to
1987, the Federal Circuit upheld 71% of the district courts' findings of infringement, in con-
trast to 67%o of the findings of non-infringement. ll at 336. But see Randall R. Rader, Special-
ized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1003, 1013 (1988) (arguing against
contention that Federal Circuit is biased in favor of patent protection).
51. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (recognizing general and
indisputable principle that existence of legal right implies remedy for invasion of that right);
Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckeshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direc-
tion in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATn. U. L. REV. 365, 371 & n.29 (1989) (citing RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 39-41 (3d ed. 1986) (alleging that economic effect of
legally recognized property interest becomes apparent only upon enforcement of right
against others)); see also BJORK, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that practical rights and powers to
assert legal rights are exceedingly circumscribed).
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing creation of Federal Circuit as
effort to remedy inconsistencies in intellectual property rights judgments that caused deterio-
ration in public perception of patent system). If the judicial treatment of patents in infringe-
ment litigation does not guarantee practical protection of intellectual property interests, the
patent grant itself becomes meaningless. A lack of effective protection undermines the ability
of the patent system to provide an economic incentive to inventors. Public disillusionment
with the patent system thus results in depressed investment in innovative technologies. See
Kastriner, supra note 4, at 9-15 (discussing importance of cooperation between branches of
government to success of patent system).
53. See Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1820, 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (approving use by patent owners of "alternative and cumulative"
remedy of declaratory judgment); see also infra notes 121-52 and accompanying text (analyzing
Lang decision in detail).
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efficient resolution of disputed issues. 54 By enacting the Declara-
tory Judgment Act (Act),55 Congress created a mechanism to fulfill
this objective.5 6 In cases in which a wronged party has not yet sued
for relief, declaratory judgment under the Act facilitates early adju-
dication of rights and obligations.5 7 Declaratory judgment can also
provide a means by which rights and obligations may be adjudicated
in cases involving controversies that have not yet reached a stage at
which either party may seek a legal remedy.58 Declaratory judgment
therefore can assume one of two roles, depending on which party
initiates the action.5 9
54. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (considering legislative intent behind pro-
mulgation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, Declaratory Judgment Act).
55. Ch. 512, 48 Star. 955, 955-56 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
2202 (1988)). The Act provides in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction .. any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.... Further
necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights
have been determined by such judgment.
Id
56. See E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.) (noting
that Congress intended to promote early adjudication and avoid waiting by passing Act), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937); see also Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391,
1393, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that essential purpose of declara-
tory judgment is "to clarify and settle disputed legal relationships and to relieve uncertainty,
insecurity and controversy"). Although available and used in all types of civil litigation, de-
claratory judgments are probably sought most often in insurance and patent litigation.
JONATHAN M. LANDERS ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 299 (2d ed. 1988) (citing CHARLES A. WRorr,
FEDERAL COURTS § 100, at 672 (4th ed. 1983)); see Lionel Corp. v. DeFilippis, 15 F. Supp. 19,
21 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (holding that Declaratory Judgment Act is applicable to patent cases).
57. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a party to an actual controversy can seek a
court determination of its potential liabilities prior to legal action by an adverse party. This
preemptive adjudication eliminates the danger of manipulation by the adverse party through
insincere threats of suit. SeeJapan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 237,
150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 589, 604 (D.NJ. 1966) (explaining that declaratory judgment relieves
parties from "the Damoclean threat of impending litigation which a harassing adversary might
brandish, while initiating suit at his leisure - or never").
58. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2751, at 568 (stating that declaratory judg-
ment represents exception to traditional and conventional concept of judicial process by
which courts intervene only when actual violation of law has occurred). The Declaratory
Judgment Act does, however, require the existence of an actual case or controversy between
the parties before a federal court can constitutionally assume jurisdiction. See Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41 (1937) (holding that jurisdiction under Declaratory
Judgment Act is contingent on existence of valid cause of action).
59. In patent infringement litigation, for example, the utility and rationale of declaratory
judgment application depends on whether the plaintiff is the alleged infringer or patent
owner. Declaratoryjudgment provides an early adjudication to the alleged infringer and pos-
sible relief from threats of infringement liability. See infra notes 69-97 and accompanying text
(considering declaratory judgment use by alleged infringers). To the patent owner, con-
versely, declaratory judgment can provide injunctive relief prior to actual infringement. See
infra notes 99-152 and accompanying text (analyzing declaratory judgment use by patent
owners).
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From the perspective of a party threatened with liability, declara-
tory judgment provides a means by which to avoid waiting until the
opposing party finds it convenient to bring suit, possibly at a time
after the damage has occurred. 60 Declaratory judgment thus mini-
mizes the danger of avoidable loss and the unnecessary accrual of
damages. 61 Conversely, from the perspective of a potential plaintiff,
declaratory judgment permits the settlement of controversies before
the actions of the potential defendant develop into actual violations
of law. 62 Declaratory relief can supersede a multiplicity of actions
by affording parties a practical, expedient, and inexpensive means
for determining their respective rights and obligations in a single
proceeding.
63
With enormous financial liabilities at stake, intellectual property
disputes require a quick and efficient means of resolution.64 Declar-
atory judgment relief appears perfectly suited to accomplish this ob-
jective.65  The specific application of declaratory judgment to
patent infringement litigation, however, has the unique practical ef-
60. See E. Edelmann & Co., 88 F.2d at 854 (observing that declaratory judgment provides
effective method of avoiding protracted litigation and judicial inequity).
61. E.g., icL at 854; Channel Master Corp. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 263 F. Supp. 7, 8, 152
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 690, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F.
Supp. at 237; see also 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2751, at 569 & n.9 (reviewing case
law that supports application of declaratory judgment as efficient means of damage control
and loss avoidance).
62. E.g., United States v. Fisher-Otis Co., 496 F.2d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 1974); Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Rosen, 445 F.2d 1012, 1014 (2d Cir. 1971); Hofstadter v. Ruderman, 118
F. Supp. 477, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2751, at 570 &
n.I 1 (examining case law that supports settlement of actual controversies by declaratory judg-
ment before maturation into violations of law).
63. E.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1215 (3d Cir.) (commenting that
declaratory judgment is efficient way to resolve disputes), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976);
Smith v. Transit Casualty Co., 281 F. Supp. 661, 670 (E.D. Tex. 1968) (stating that declara-
tory judgment is less costly than protracted litigation), aff'd, 410 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969);
Security Ins. Co. v. Jay, 109 F. Supp. 87, 89 (D. Minn. 1952) (holding that declaratory judg-
ment is effective means of avoiding multiplicity of actions); see 1OA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
12, § 2751, at 570-71 & n.12 (examining case law that supports application of declaratory
judgment to avoid multiplicity of actions).
64. See McCarroll, supra note 42, at 44 (recognizing that inadequate protection of intel-
lectual property costs United States' economy approximately $80 billion in sales each year).
In January 1991, Eastman Kodak was ordered to pay almost $900 million to Polaroid for
infringement of Polaroid's instant photography patents. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 17 U.S.P.q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1714 (D. Mass. 1991). In March 1991, a federal district court
fined Kinko's Graphics $510,000 for illegally photocopying and selling excerpts of books to
college students. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437, 1439 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Mirage Studios, creator of the immensely
popular Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles characters, has filed a $100 million trademark action
against American Telephone and Telegraph for the unauthorized use in 900-number tele-
phone services of the terms "turtle power" and "cowabunga." McCarroll, supra note 42, at
44.
65. See generally 1 LipscoMB, supra note 30, § 24:7, at 190-98 (explaining usefulness of
Declaratory Judgment Act in patent situations).
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fect of broadening the legal rights of patent owners. 66 The inherent
duality of declaratory judgment did not become manifest in patent
infringement litigation until the judicial recognition of actions by
patent owners against prospective infringers.67 Until recently, ap-
plication of declaratory relief in patent infringement litigation has
been limited to suits by manufacturers of allegedly infringing prod-
ucts against patent owners. 68
B. Traditional Application of Declaratory Judgment to Patent Law:
Actions Initiated by Alleged Infringers
Most declaratory judgment actions in the patent field are brought
by manufacturers of allegedly infringing products against patent
owners after manufacture has already begun.69 Declaratory judg-
ment allows a manufacturer to determine whether its product would
infringe a patented invention without waiting until the patent owner
finds it convenient to file suit.70 The manufacturer can, through this
procedure, avoid an accrual of damages or liability altogether.
7'
Such a resolution of disputed matters clearly fulfills the legislative
66. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing utility of declaratory judgment
to patent owners as preventive measure against future infringement).
67. See Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 763-64, 13 U.S.P.QJ2d (BNA)
1820, 1822 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (establishing controlling precedent in all future patent decisions
to permit declaratory judgment use by patent owners); Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. &
Co., 223 F. Supp. 87, 90, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 169, 171 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (promulgating first
reported decision to allow use of declaratory judgment by patent owners), aff'd on reh 'g, 225 F.
Supp. 412, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373 (S.D. Tex. 1964); see also infra notes 99-152 and accompa-
nying text (discussing development ofjurisprudence from Pro lr Steel through Lang that recog-
nized propriety of declaratory judgment use by patent owners against prospective infringers).
68. The current controversy over use of declaratory judgment relief by patent owners
closely parallels that experienced by manufacturers when they first began seeking declaratory
relief against threats of infringement. See E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88
F.2d 852, 854, 32 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 416, 417 (7th Cir.) (upholding use of declaratory judgment
by alleged infringer), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937). The court in Edelmann repudiated judi-
cial opinion against the use of declaratory judgment as a mechanism by which an alleged
infringer could bring suit. Id. So long as an actual controversy arising under the patent laws
existed, the court held that declaratory judgment was applicable, irrespective of the party
bringing suit. Id
69. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1141 (reviewing suits by alleged infringers to have
others' patents declared invalid or not infringed).
70. See Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 89, 137 U.S.P.Qt (BNA)
235, 236 (2d Cir. 1963) (arguing that declaratory judgment has destroyed "the racket" by
which patent owners, without litigating issue of patent validity, can gain business advantage
and suppress competition by threatening alleged infringers or their customers with lawsuits
which might never be brought).
71. In the absence of a procedural remedy such as declaratory judgment for determining
its rights and obligations in an early adjudication, a manufacturer risks a finding by the court
of willfulness once actual infringement occurs. This situation exposes the manufacturer to the
potential of liability three times the actual damage award. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). The pur-
pose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to afford relief against such liability exposure. S.
REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934).
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intent of the Declaratory Judgment Act.72
Jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, however, is not
dependent on the actual commission of an infringing act.73 Instead,
the sole requirement for jurisdiction is "justiciability," or the exist-
ence of an "actual controversy" between the parties. 74 In patent
infringement litigation, two tests must be met to support a finding
of justiciability. 75 First, the declaratory judgment plaintiff must be
under reasonable apprehension of potential liability resulting from
a charge of infringement. 76 Second, the plaintiff must be, or have
been, engaged in the allegedly infringing acts or have the ability and
definite intention to engage immediately in such acts.77
Courts have liberally construed the first requirement that the
plaintiff be under reasonable apprehension of suit by the patent
owner.78 Reasonable apprehension of liability for existing or future
72. See Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 285, 289 (1943) (cit-
ing S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934)) (stating that purpose of Declaratory
Judgment Act is to afford relief against "peril and insecurity" of potential damages in in-
fringement suits); Wembley, 315 F.2d at 90, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 236 (arguing that rationale
for allowing declaratory judgment is avoidance of economic waste incurred in embarking on
program of manufacture, use, or sale that turns out to be illegal).
73. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1141 (discussing declaratory judgment actions brought
by alleged infringers prior to occurrence of any act that could constitute infringement).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1988); see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41
(1937) (interpreting Declaratory Judgment Act and defining "actual controversy"); see also
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUrr 94 & nA9a (Supp. 1990) (citing Ar-
rowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685,
1688 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (explaining requirement for jurisdiction under Declaratory Judgment
Act). The conflict must be "real and immediate" for a "true, actual controversy" to exist as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Id Even when there is a clear controversy, however, a district
court's decision to exercise its jurisdiction is discretionary. Id. at 95 & n.53c.
75. See, e.g., Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736-37, 6
U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1685, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (upholding two-prong test to determine
existence of actual controversy); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d
953, 955, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (reaffirming use of two-prong test
to ensure courts do not render advisory opinions); Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc.,
781 F.2d 879, 882-83, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 845, 847-48 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding actual
controversy test and commenting that test is objective), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986);Jervis
B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398-99, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 943, 949
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding case or controversy requirement for patent declaratory judgment
requires presence of two elements); International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d
1207, 1210-11, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1980) (setting forth prerequisites for
establishing actual controversy).
76. See International Harvester, 623 F.2d at 1210, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 775 (reciting first
test for justiciability under DeclaratoryJudgment Act in patent infringement litigation). The
patent owner "must have engaged in conduct giving rise to a reasonable apprehension on
[the manufacturer's] part that [the manufacturer) will face an infringement suit or the threat
of one if it commences or continues the activity in question." Id.
77, See id at 12 10-11, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 775 (describing second test forjusticiability
under Declaratory Judgment Act in patent infringement litigation). The manufacturer "must
have actually produced the accused article or have engaged in preparations for production
such that but for a finding that the product infringes or for extraordinary or unforeseen con-
tingencies, the [manufacturer] would and could begin production immediately." Id. (quoting
Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439 F.2d 871, 875 (Ist Cir. 1971)).
78. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1153 (concluding from survey of declaratory judgment
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conduct may arise from direct or indirect charges of infringement by
the patent owner against the manufacturer of the allegedly infring-
ing products. 79 Before the necessary apprehension can exist, how-
ever, the patent owner must have taken some affirmative action.8 0
For example, direct notice by the patent owner to a manufacturer of
the manufacturer's potential infringement liability qualifies as an af-
firmative act that would give rise to reasonable apprehension.8' In
the context of licensing negotiations, however, a patent owner's
statement to a manufacturer regarding potential infringement liabil-
ity does not constitute reasonable apprehension, even if the negotia-
tions are unsuccessful.8 2
Reasonable apprehension of liability can also exist when a patent
owner gives general notice that it intends to enforce its patent.83
Despite the patent owner's ignorance of a manufacturer's activity,
reasonable apprehension exists if the manufacturer believes the pat-
ent is broad enough to render its activity an infringement.8 4 If, on
the other hand, the patent owner has done nothing beyond securing
a patent, there can be no basis for the required apprehension.8 5
actions by alleged infringers that requirement of reasonable apprehension has been liberally
construed).
79. See United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Henderson, 495 F. Supp. 444, 446, 210
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 274, 275 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding existence of actual controversy not only
upon charge of infringement, but also upon indirect charge if party has well-grounded fear
that, absent alteration of its conduct, infringement suit may result).
80. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1143-44 (discussing kind of action on part of patent
holder necessary to constitute reasonable apprehension).
81. See, e.g., National Coupling Co. v. Press-Seal Gasket Corp., 323 F.2d 629, 632, 139
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 99 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding that letter sent by patent owner to manufac-
turer that charged contributory infringement constitutes affirmative act justifying reasonable
apprehension); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 102 F.2d 105, 108, 41 U.S.P.QJ
(BNA) 342, 343 (6th Cir. 1939) (finding that complaint alleging infringement justified reason-
able apprehension because it was affirmative act); Medtronic, Inc. v. American Optical Corp.,
327 F. Supp. 1327, 1329, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252, 254 (D. Minn. 1971) (considering letter
sent by patent owner's counsel containing infringement opinion of activity at issue and con-
cluding that letter constituted reasonable apprehension); see 10A WRIGrr ET AL., supra note
12, § 2761, at 676-78 & n.13 (listing cases that find direct notice by patent owner to alleged
infringer to constitute reasonable apprehension).
82. See Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., No. 91-1364, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17308, at *12
(Fed. Cir. July 28, 1992) (finding that patent owner's statements regarding manufacturer's
activities as falling within patent claims were merely "jawboning' which typically occurs in
licensing negotiations" and therefore did not create reasonable apprehension of suit).
83. See Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 705-06, 50 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 593,
596 (3d Cir. 1941) (finding reasonable apprehension where advertisement by corporate pat-
ent owner in trade journal stated intention to fully protect its patent rights).
84. See Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. American Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68, 71, 58 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 456, 459 (3d Cir.) (determining that reasonable apprehension may exist even in ab-
sence of any communication between patent owner and alleged infringer), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 761 (1943).
85. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736, 6 U.S.P.O,2d
(BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1988). But see West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Resources,
Inc., No. 91-1485, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18820, at "14-15 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 13, 1992) (Lourie,
J., dissenting) (stating that despite absence of direct communication between patent owner
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Courts will protect quiescent patent owners of this kind against un-
warranted litigation by manufacturers.
86
In contrast to the broad interpretation of the reasonable appre-
hension justiciability requirement, courts have tended to strictly
construe the second component of the requirement. Courts require
a declaratory judgment plaintiff to be, or to have been, engaged in
the allegedly infringing activity, or to have the ability and definite
intention to engage immediately in such conduct.8 7 Determination
of the amount of preparation necessary to satisfy the immediacy
standard is one of degree.8 8 Therefore, an examination of the facts
of each individual case becomes especially significant. 89
No single factor is dispositive in determining the point at which a
threat of potential infringement satisfies the immediacy standard.90
The greater the degree of preparation for an allegedly infringing
activity, however, the greater the likelihood that courts will sustain
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.91 Courts tend to focus on two
specific circumstances in finding an ability and definite intention to
engage immediately in allegedly infringing conduct.92 One such cir-
cumstance is the situation in which a manufacturer procures an as-
sured source of product within a few months of instituting legal
and manufacturer, fact that patent owner sued three other similarly situated companies sup-
ports conclusion that manufacturer had reasonable apprehension of suit).
86. Id; cf. Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cr vats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 90, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
235, 236 (2d Cir. 1963) (relating unfairness in subjecting patent owner to burdens of lawsuit
in allowing declaratory judgment where manufacturer expressed only vague and unspecific
desire to embark on allegedly infringing conduct).
87. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1153 (concluding from survey of declaratory judgment
actions by alleged infringers that requirement of ability and intention to engage immediately
in potentially infringing conduct has been strictly construed).
88. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
89. See Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1399, 222 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that existence of case or controversy must be evalu-
ated on claim-by-claim basis); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 880, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 197, 203 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (commenting that both tests of justiciability requirement
depend on consideration of all facts and circumstances involved).
90. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1144-53 (discussing multiple factors weighed by courts
in considering immediacy standard). Declaratory judgment plaintiffs must establish an actual
controversy on the "totality of the circumstances." E.g., Mayland Casualty Co., 312 U.S. at
273; International Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc. v. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc.,
787 F.2d 572, 575, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1986); C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 880,
219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 203.
91. See Southwire Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 729,
730-31 (E.D. La. 1977) (holding that amount of preparation by manufacturer toward allegedly
infringing activity is important factor in determination ofjusticiability); cf Sweetheart Plastics,
Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439 F.2d 871, 875, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 737, 740 (Ist Cir.
1971) (following strict construction of immediacy and reality requirement whereby alleged
infringing manufacturer must show preparations for production that suggest that, but for
finding of infringement liability or for extraordinary and unforeseen contingencies, manufac-
turer would, and could, begin production immediately).
92. See generally Voight, supra note 10, at 1144-53 (summarizing factors deemed necessary
by courts to show intention to engage immediately in allegedly infringing acts).
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action.93 The second and perhaps more significant circumstance is
the solicitation by a manufacturer of customer orders for the poten-
tially infringing product.
94
Ambiguity remains in defining the amount of preparation re-
quired to constitute immediate ability to engage in infringing con-
duct, the second requirement for finding declaratory judgment
justiciability. 95 Inconsistencies in judicial determinations on this is-
sue presumably result from an interplay of competing concerns. 96
Tension exists between the statutory intention supporting the lib-
eral application of the declaratory judgment remedy and the fear
that, in the absence of a strict interpretation of the immediacy stan-
dard, declaratory judgments would degenerate into advisory opin-
ions for manufacturers. 97 This dynamic of competing judicial
concerns is heightened by patent owner use of declaratory judgment
against prospective infringers, where the application of the remedy
has several unique consequences. 98
III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS BY PATENT OWNERS
A. Juispndential Development
Declaratory judgment actions by patent owners are a recent devel-
opment in patent law relative to declaratory judgment actions by
93. See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 539,211 U.S.P.Q0 (BNA) 303, 310
(3d Cir.) (sustaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction on basis of actual sale of device two
months after filing of complaint), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); General Elec. Co. v. Re-
frigeration Patents Corp., 65 F. Supp. 75, 81, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324, 326-27 (W.D.N.Y.
1946) (holding that active preparation even six to nine months prior to actual production
could be adequately "immediate"); cf. Akzona, Inc. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 662 F.
Supp. 603, 611-14,4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113, 1118-22 (D. Del. 1987) (finding no existence of
actual controversy even though manufacturer was ready to begin production because Interna-
tional Trade Commission prevented importation of necessary materials into United States).
94. See, e.g., Interdynamics, Inc. v. Wolf, 698 F.2d 157, 169, 217 U.S.P.OJ (BNA) 117,
127 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that manufacturer's deadline of filling orders for its product within
few weeks time demonstrated intention to engage immediately in patent infringement); Super
Prods. Corp. v. DP Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748, 752-53, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 417, 421-22 (7th
Cir. 1976) (affirming justiciability because active solicitation of customer orders strongly sug-
gested definite intention to continue infringing conduct); Brisk Waterproofing Co. v. A. Be-
langer & Sons, Inc., 209 F.2d 169, 170, 100 U.S.P.. (BNA) 75, 76 (1st Cir. 1954) (finding
justiciability requirement satisfied because manufacturer was seriously engaged in promoting
its system to potential customers).
95. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1145 (commenting that many factors are weighed by
courts to determine whether preparative activity is "about to infringe").
96. See HARMON, supra note 74, at 94 (explaining that competing considerations in declar-
atory judgment jurisdiction are of constitutional dimension).
97. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1154 (explaining that existence of alternative, entirely
non-infringing, plans by manufacturer is factor that would likely defeat declaratory judgment
jurisdiction). Without the ability to determine which of several possible courses a manufac-
turer might pursue, a court essentially would be rendering an advisory opinion. Id.
98. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (relating concerns that use of declara-
tory judgment by patent owners will give rise to rendering of advisory opinions, provision of
additional, unnecessary remedy, and circumvention of venue rules).
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alleged infringers. 99 The requirements that patent owners must sat-
isfy for jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act are analo-
gous to those articulated for declaratory actions brought by
manufacturers of allegedly infringing products. 00 The use of de-
claratory judgment by patent owners, however, requires the con-
frontation of additional legal issues. 10 Controversy and hesitation
over these considerations might explain the delay in judicial accept-
ance of this converse use of declaratory judgment.1 0 2
The earliest cases of declaratory judgment use by patent owners
involved actions brought after the allegedly infringing activity had
occurred.103 Because the patent owners already possessed fully ade-
quate remedies through conventional infringement actions, courts
properly rejected, as inappropriate, the use of declaratory judgment
in such circumstances. 104 These cases may nonetheless have created
a climate of judicial suspicion concerning use of the declaratory
judgment remedy by patent owners.10 5
99. See Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 223 F. Supp. 87, 89, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
169, 171 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (holding, as first court in nation to so do, that patent owners may
employ declaratory judgment remedy against potential infringers); see also 6 CHisuM, supra
note 14, § 21.02[1][D], at 21-49 (discussing declaratory judgment actions by patent owners);
Voight, supra note 10, at 1156 (examining suits by patent owners to have patents declared
valid and prospectively infringed).
100. See Proler Steel, 223 F. Supp. at 90, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 171-72 (stating that re-
quirements that manufacturers must satisfy to gain declaratory judgment relief are "of some
significance" when analyzing requirements that patent owners must satisfy to gain such re-
lieo. Patent owners must also show the existence of an actual controversy to establish declar-
atory judgment jurisdiction. Id at 89, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 172. As in cases involving
declaratory judgment use by alleged infringers, there are two prerequisites to a finding of
justiciability. Id First, the patent owner must produce a reasonable apprehension of infringe-
ment liability in the alleged infringer. Id Second, the alleged infringer must be engaged in
meaningful preparations for production. It; see also infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text
(analyzing justiciability requirements set forth in Proler Steel).
101. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing concerns raised in applica-
tion of declaratory judgment to suits by patent owners).
102. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (suggesting underlying rationale for rejec-
tion of declaratory use by patent owners).
103. See Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp. v. United States Indus. Chems., Inc., 140 F.2d
47, 48, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 216, 217 (4th Cir. 1944) (dismissing suit instituted to obtain de-
claratory judgment as to validity of reissue patent); Clayton v. Swift & Co., 132 F. Supp. 154,
158-59, 106 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35, 37-38 (E.D. Va. 1955) (transferring case to state where de-
fendant had committed alleged infringing activity).
104. In fact, the initial declaratory judgment actions by patent owners were transparent
attempts to forum shop. Voight, supra note 10, at 1158 n.8. In these cases, patent owners
sought to avoid the narrow reach of the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988), and
to take advantage of the broader general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988), which gov-
erns all declaratory judgment actions. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp. v. United States In-
dus. Chems., Inc., 140 F.2d 47, 50, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 216, 218 (4th Cir. 1944); Clayton v.
Swift & Co., 132 F. Supp. 154, 157-58, 106 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35, 36-37 (E.D. Va. 1955).
105. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (explaining judicial concern regarding
provision of declaratory judgment to patent owners because of possibility patent owners
might attempt to forum shop). But see infra note 148 and accompanying text (addressing Fed-
eral Circuit decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.). VE Holding held that the
1988 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) supplemented 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), and thereby es-
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The first reported use of declaratory judgment by a patent owner
against a prospective infringer was the 1963 decision, Proler Steel Corp.
v. Luria Bros. & Co. 106 While recognizing that declaratory judgment
relief had previously only been sought by alleged infringers, the
court in Proler Steel saw no valid reason for denying this remedy to a
patent owner so long as the patent owner satisfied an equivalent re-
quirement of justiciability.10 7 Although several subsequent cases
embraced the Proler Steel rationale, 08 a significant number of deci-
sions took the contrary position that declaratory judgment actions
by patent owners are not proper under any circumstances.1 0 9 Re-
jection of the Proler Steel reasoning focused on legal issues identified
by the courts as unique to patent owner-initiated declaratory judg-
sentially eliminated any potential advantage in bringing declaratory judgment for purposes of
forum shopping. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 16
U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991)).
106. 223 F. Supp. 87, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 169 (S.D. Tex. 1963). Proler Steel Corpora-
tion brought a declaratory judgment action in Texas asserting that a manufacturing plant
under construction by the Luria Brothers in California was designed to practice a process
covered by one of Proler Steel's patents. Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 223 F. Supp.
87, 88, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 169, 170 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
107. Id at 89, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 171. Proler Steel came before the district court on
Luria Brothers' motion to dismiss. Id at 88, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 170. The court applied
the identical test for a finding ofjusticiability as that developed in cases involving declaratory
judgment actions brought by alleged infringers. Id. at 89-90, 139 U.S.P.QO (BNA) at 172.
After so doing, the court denied Luria Brothers' motion to dismiss and held that a sufficient
justiciable controversy existed to entitle Proler Steel to maintain its declaratory judgment ac-
tion. Id at 91, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 173. The Proler Steel case came before the district court
again on Luria Brothers' motion for reconsideration of the previous failure to dismiss. Proler
Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 225 F. Supp. 412, 413, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373, 373 (S.D.
Tex. 1964). During the intervening period since the first case, however, Luria Brothers' Cali-
fornia plant had commenced operations. Id. at 412, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 373. Conse-
quently, the district court felt that the injunctive relief requested by Proler Steel was
inappropriate. Id Exercising its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the court declined de-
claratory judgment jurisdiction. Id. at 414, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 374. The district court
dismissed the suit without prejudice, however, so Proler Steel was free to bring a later action
for actual infringement. Id.
108. See Automation Sys., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 345, 346-47, 209 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 573, 574-75 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (analyzing microcomputer chip infringement of
programmable logic controller patent using Proler Steel reasoning); Andco Envtl. Processes,
Inc. v. Niagara Envtl. Assocs., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656, 658 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying Proler
Steel in context of chromate removal systems patents).
109. See, e.g., Swedlow, Inc. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 455 F.2d 884, 886-87, 172 U.S.P.QJ
(BNA) 641, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1972) (arguing that conventional use of declaratory judgment
precludes use by patent owners who have corollary remedy available in patent infringement
suit); D.G. Rung Indus., Inc. v. Tinnerman, 626 F. Supp. 1062, 1064-65, 229 U.S.P.OQ (BNA)
930, 931-32 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (relying on conventional rule of DeclaratoryJudgment Act set
forth in Swedlow to dismiss patent owner's declaratory judgment motion); Ecodyne Corp. v.
Croll-Reynolds Eng'g Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 196, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 601, 602-03 (D. Conn.
1979) (dismissing patent owner's motion for declaratory judgment for lack of jurisdiction
based on court's holding in Swedlow that nojusticiable controversy exists when defendant has
not yet engaged in infringing activity); Pullman Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 437 F. Supp. 1062,
1066, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464, 467-68 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (rejecting patent owner's declara-
tory judgment action based on rationale used in Swedlow). In direct contrast with Proler Steel,
the Swedlow decision presented a rationale against declaratory judgment use by patent owners.
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ment actions." 0 Three leading considerations emerged in the
controversy.
First, concern arose regarding the possibility that a manufacturer
might not actually go forward with its threatened acts or might so
alter them as to change the issues substantially."' To rule on de-
claratory judgment would thus be to render an advisory opinion.
12
A second issue dealt with the notion that a patent owner, unlike an
infringer, already has an express statutory remedy and thus should
not be given an additional one."13 Clearly reluctant to strengthen
patent rights at innovator's expense, a number of courts refused to
recognize a procedural remedy that would enlarge the protections
already available to patent owners." 4 A third consideration in-
volved concern that the application of declaratory judgment juris-
diction to patent owner-initiated suits would contravene the
purpose of the restrictive patent venue statute." 5 Declaratory judg-
ment actions are governed by the broad general venue statute,
whether or not they involve patent issues.1 16 Courts therefore
feared that patent owners might attempt to forum shop by circum-
venting the patent venue statute in favor of the general venue stat-
ute simply by instituting a declaratory judgment action. 117
110. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (examining legal issues raised by courts
rejecting use of declaratory judgment by patent owners under all circumstances).
111. Swedlow, 455 F.2d at 886, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 642 (examining alleged threats of
future infringement and finding them to be too remote and unduly speculative to be of great
concern).
112. See id at 885, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 642 (noting that in reality, complaint sought
advisory opinion of infringement).
113. See id. (examining issue that patent owner already had "corollary remedy" available
in conventional infringement suit).
114. See, e.g., Swedlow, Inc. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 455 F.2d 884, 885-86, 172 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 641, 642 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that no reason is sufficient to justify giving patent
owners "broader substantive rights than are available under the Patent Statutes"); Ecodyne
Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Eng'g Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 196, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 601, 603 (D.
Conn. 1979) (dismissing patent holder's claim and stating that patent owner has remedy avail-
able in conventional patent infringement action when actual infringement becomes clear);
Pullman, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 437 F. Supp. 1062, 1066, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464,467-68
(W.D. Okla. 1976) (citing Swedlow and holding that court lacked jurisdiction until such time as
alleged infringement activity took place).
115. See Swedlow, 455 F.2d at 885-86, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 642 (rejecting use of Declara-
tory Judgment Act to increase scope of patent rights); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988)
(providing that "any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business").
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988) (establishing, inter alia, that declaratory judgment
actions can properly be brought "in any judicial district in which [defendant] is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced"); see also Sampson, infra note 148
and accompanying text (discussing general venue statute before its amendment in 1988).
117. See 1 I.PSCOMB,supra note 30, § 24:11, at 217 & n.12 (concluding that overwhelming
weight of case-law authority holds that in declaratory judgment action concerning patent in-
fringement, restrictive patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), is inapplicable). Instead,
the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, dictates the appropriate forum. General Tire &
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These concerns reflect a judicial bias against providing patent
owners with any procedures or remedies that might increase the
scope of patent protection." 8 Authority remained split for quite
some time, however, as to the ultimate issue of declaratory judg-
ment availability to patent owners.' 19 The Federal Circuit eventu-
ally confronted these issues and resolved the dichotomy in Lang v.
Pacific Marine & Supply Co. 120
B. Analysis of Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co.
In this seminal case, the Federal Circuit established the propriety
of suits by patent owners to have their patents declared valid and
prospectively infringed.' 2 ' The Federal Circuit essentially repudi-
ated jurisprudence that disfavored declaratory judgment actions by
patent owners because of concern that such relief strengthened pat-
ent rights.'
22
In Lang, the owner and the licensee of two patents that pertained
to certain features of a ship's hull instituted a declaratory judgment
action in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 326 F.2d 926,929, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 101, 102 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 909 (1964); Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 938,
940, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 163, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 30, § 24:11, at
216. Thus a patent owner could take advantage of a wider choice of proper forums under 28
U.S.C. § 1391, as compared to that under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), by bringing a declaratory
judgment suit. The amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 13 91(c) by the Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act of 1988, however, essentially eliminated concern over forum shopping
by patent owners using declaratory judgment. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c) (1982)); see infra note 148 and accompanying text (addressing in detail impact of
1988 amendment to general venue statute on patent infringement litigation).
118. The language employed by courts supporting the Swedlow rationale for denying de-
claratory judgment use by patent owners clearly indicates concern over increasing the scope
of patent protection. The conclusions drawn by the court in Swedlow contravene the purposes
of declaratory relief in providing efficient adjudication of rights and obligations before actual
violations of law occur to avoid accrual of unnecessary damages. See infra text accompanying
note 166 (suggesting that courts' rejection of declaratory judgment use by patent owners
stems from failure to focus on purpose of remedy).
119. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (illustrating long-term dichotomy in
patent law jurisprudence over application of declaratory judgment remedy to patent owners).
120. 895 F.2d 761, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
121. Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA) 1820,
1823 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The Federal Circuit noted that declaratory judgment actions in the
patent field were most commonly brought by potential infringers seeking a declaration of
patent invalidity or, in the alternative, a statement of non-infringement against patent owners.
Id at 763, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. The court, however, also recognized that declara-
tions of infringement sought by patent owners against prospective infringers, although less
frequently requested, have nevertheless been allowed to proceed. Id. (citing Erbamount Inc.
v. Cetus Corp., 720 F. Supp. 387, 390, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1347 (D. Del. 1989);
Westnofa USA Inc. v. British Design (U.S.A.) Corp., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 138 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Automation Sys., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 345, 348, 209 U.S.P.Q, (BNA) 573,
575 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 223 F. Supp. 87, 90, 139
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 169, 172 (S.D. Tex. 1963)).
122. Lang, 895 F.2d at 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822.
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against the defendant corporations, Pacific Marine and Supply Co.
(Pacific Marine) and Thompson Metal Fabricators, Inc. (Thompson
Metals). 123 Pacific Marine had retained Thompson Metals to manu-
facture the hull structure for Pacific Marine's swath-type sailing
vessel.' 24 Furthermore, Pacific Marine had publicly announced its
construction of this ship.
1 25
The plaintiffs, Thomas G. Lang (Lang) and Swath Ocean Systems,
Inc. (SOSI), filed suit when the ship hull structure was still under
construction by Thompson Metals. 126 Lang and SOSI asserted that
this hull structure, upon completion, would infringe the patents
owned by Lang and SOSI.127 The plaintiffs sought a declaration
that Thompson Metals' manufacturing activity constituted prospec-
tive infringement. 128 The defendant corporations moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and in the alter-
native, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.'
29
The district court held that a patent owner could not bring an
action under the Declaratory Judgment Act where there had not yet
123. Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 703 F. Supp. 1404, 1405, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1058, 1058 (D. Haw. 1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 761, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
124. Id at 1406, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058. Swath-type ships are a class of sailing
vessel with small water-plane-area twin hulls, which reduce drag and improve stability to per-
mit high speed operations on the ocean and better overall performance than conventional
ships.
125. Id at 1406, 10 U.S.P..2d (BNA) at 1059 (describing Pacific Marine's public an-
nouncement of design of its swath-type vessel's control systems by Donald Higdon and
Associates).
126. Id Lang and SOSI commenced this action on April 25, 1988, more than nine
months prior to the February 1989 scheduled completion of the hull structure and the final
Coast Guard inspection of the ship owned by Pacific Marine. Id
127. Id. at 1405, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059. Lang and SOSI are, respectively, the
patent owner and licensee of U.S. Patent Nos. 3,877,744 ('744 patent), issued on August 5,
1975 and entitled "High speed semisubmerged ship with four struts," and 3,623,444 ('444
patent), issued on November 30, 1971 and entitled "High-speed ship with submerged hulls."
l at 1405, 10 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1058. Pacific Marine owns U.S. Patent No. 4,174,671
('671 patent), issued on Nov. 20, 1979 and entitled "Semisubmerged ship". Id Pacific
Marine asserted that its '671 patent encompassed the swath-type vessel under construction
and that the ship's hull structure did not iifringe either the '744 patent or the '444 patent
owned by the plaintiffs. Id
128. Id at 1406, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059. The plaintiffs asserted five separate
causes of action in their complaint, only Count One and Count Two of which are relevant to
this Comment's discussion. Count One sought a declaration, based on 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that
through Thompson Metals' contractual relationship with Pacific Marine to manufacture a hull
structure, Pacific Marine was "infringing" or "'threatening' to infringe" the plaintiffs' pat-
ents. Id. Count Two sought an injunction, based on the general equity power of the court,
against a "threatened trespass" on the plaintiffs' patents. Id The allegations contained in the
remaining three counts of the complaint included false patent marking in violation of 35
U.S.C. § 292, false representation and unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), and unfair methods of competition in violation of Ha-
waii state law, HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 480-2, 481A-3 (Supp. 1991). Id
129. Id.
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been an actual infringement of the patents. 130 The district court fol-
lowed the Ninth Circuit's holding in Swedlow, Inc. v. Rohm & Haas
Co. 13 1 In Swedlow, the Ninth Circuit held that declaratory judgment
relief for a patent owner is inappropriate because the owner is
harmed only if actual infringement occurs, an act for which the pat-
ent owner already has a statutory remedy. 3 2 Applying this ration-
ale, the district court in Lang found that the patent owner and the
licensee were essentially seeking an advisory opinion and had an ad-
equate legal remedy in a conventional patent infringement suit that
could be filed once the vessel reached completion.13 3 Furthermore,
because no actual infringement had yet occurred, the plaintiffs were
not stating a claim upon which relief could be granted under the
federal patent statutes.13 4 The district court thus dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint. 3 5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court's reason-
ing. 136 The Federal Circuit held that so long as the justiciability re-
quirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act is met by a sufficient
allegation of immediacy and reality, a patent owner may seek a dec-
laration of infringement against a prospective infringer.' 3 7 Given
130. Idl at 1408-09, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
131. 455 F.2d 884, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641 (9th Cir. 1972).
132. Swedlow, Inc. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 455 F.2d 884, 885-86, 172 U.S.P.Q0 (BNA) 641,
641-42 (9th Cir. 1972); see supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text (discussing rationale of
Swedlow and other cases that rejected declaratory judgments filed by patent owners).
133. See Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 703 F. Supp. 1404, 1409, 10 U.S.P.Q,2d
(BNA) 1058, 1061 (D. Haw. 1989) (recognizing split authority on propriety of declaratory
judgment use by patent owners), aft'd, 895 F.2d 761, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
134. Id at 1409-10, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
135. See id at 1409 & n.12, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061 & n.12 (noting that even if
justiciability requirement had been satisfied, district court would have exercised its discretion
to decline jurisdiction under Declaratory Judgment Act). Discretion in declaratory judgment
actions is to be" 'exercised in the public interest' and in such a manner as 'to strike a proper
balance between the needs of [the patent owner] and the consequences of giving the desired
relief.'" Id at 1409 n.12, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061 n.12 (citing Eccles v. Peoples Bank,
333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948)). The district court focused on the availability of alternative reme-
dies, the public importance of the declaration, and the equity of the parties' conduct. Id. The
court reiterated that both Lang and Swath Ocean Systems, Inc. had an adequate remedy avail-
able if the ship, upon completion, constituted an infringement. Id Next, the district court
noted that the public had no interest in prejudging the issue of infringement between the
parties. Id The court concluded its analysis by stating that Pacific Marine & Supply Co. and
Thompson Metal Fabricators, Inc. should be allowed to engage in their manufacturing activity
at their own risk. Id Each conclusion reached by the district court, however, appears to con-
travene the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to provide an efficient resolution of
matters in dispute. The district court's holding permits the potential accrual of damages by
manufacturers uncertain of their liabilities. Moreover, the public has a clear interest in avoid-
ing economic waste.
136. Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1820,
1822 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
137. Id. (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (explaining that "[t]he sole requirement for
1992] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT USE BY PATENT OWNERS
that an alleged infringer may maintain a declaratory judgment ac-
tion for non-infringement under the same circumstances, the court
found no valid reason for denying this remedy to a patent owner. 138
The Federal Circuit set forth a two-prong test designed to detect
the existence of a definite and substantial controversy in satisfaction
of the justiciability requirement for declaratory judgment jurisdic-
tion.139 First, the defendant must be engaged in or making mean-
ingful preparations for engagement in an activity directed toward
making, selling, or using a patented invention that is subject to an
infringement charge under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 140 This element,
which looks to the activity of the manufacturer, is analogous to the
immediacy requirement that developed in cases where the declara-
tory judgment plaintiff is the alleged infringer.14 1 Second, the
defendant must refuse to alter its course of conduct in response to
acts by the patent owner that are sufficient to create a reasonable
apprehension that a suit will be forthcoming. 142 This element,
which looks to the activity of the patent owner, is analogous to the
requirement of reasonable apprehension traditionally articulated by
courts regarding declaratory judgment actions brought by alleged
infringers. 1
43
In addition to establishing an objective test for the existence of
actual controversy, the Federal Circuit discounted the legal issues
raised by the various lower courts that criticized the Proler Steel ra-
tionale. First, the Federal Circuit ruled that concern over whether
an alleged infringer might alter its course of conduct or discontinue
the conduct altogether should no more warrant dismissal than
should the potential for a similar alteration of conduct by a patent
owner in a declaratory judgment suit brought by an alleged in-
fringer. 144 Moreover, a determination of whether preparation by
the prospective infringer has been sufficiently meaningful would
jurisdiction under the [Declaratory Judgment] Act is that the conflict be real and immediate,




141. See Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1820, 1822 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689)
(comparing meaningful preparation element of test in Lang to corresponding activity element
of test developed in cases in which declaratory judgment was brought by alleged infringer).
142. Id
143. See Lang, 895 F.2d at 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822 (dtingArrowhead, 846 F.2d at
736, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689) (considering reasonable apprehension element ofjus-
ticiability analysis); supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (discussing justiciability require-
ment that defendant have reasonable apprehension of liability).
144. See Lang, 895 F.2d at 764, 13 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1822 (contravening Swedlow ra-
tionale); cf supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (examining Swedlow case denying patent
owners use of declaratory judgment remedy).
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necessarily take into account these contingencies. 145
Next, the Federal Circuit found the fact that a patent owner, un-
like an alleged infringer, has an express statutory remedy for in-
fringement at a later time to be irrelevant.1 46 The Declaratory
Judgment Act was intended to have broad applicability so that par-
ties to actual controversies in different types of litigation could seek
adjudication of their rights in a timely fashion, irrespective of
whether further relief is or could be sought.' 47 Finally, the Federal
Circuit in Lang did not need to consider the issue of potential forum
shopping by patent owners taking advantage of the general venue
statute. The 1988 amendment of the general venue statute and sub-
sequent decisions interpreting that amendment eliminated any pos-
sible forum selection advantage in declaratory judgment use by
patent owners. 1
48
145. Determination of the totality of facts and circumstances would entail a determination
of possible alternative courses of action. As in declaratory judgment actions by alleged in-
fringers, the existence of alternative plans would likely defeat declaratory judgment jurisdic-
tion. See Voight, supra note 10, at 1154 and note 97 (explaining that declaratory judgment
jurisdiction cannot be sustained where alternative plans remain under consideration).
146. Lang, 895 F.2d at 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822.
147. Id. (quoting 1OA WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 12, § 2758, at 620-21) (explaining that
"declaratory relief is alternative and cumulative" and "that the existence of another remedy
does not bar a declaratory judgment").
148. See Michael L. Keller & KennethJ. Nunnenkamp, Patent Law Developments in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1990, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1157, 1188 (1991)
(asserting that plaintiffs now possess significantly greater choices regarding where to bring
patent infringement actions as result of 1988 amendments to general venue statute and Fed-
eral Circuit's opinion in VE Holding Corp. v.Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991)). See generally
MatthewJ. Sampson, Note, Corporate Venue in Patent Infringement Cases, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 207,
234-44 (1991) (providing legislative history and statutory interpretation of 1988 amendments
to general venue statute and specific impact of amendments to patent infringement litigation).
Prior to the amendment of the general venue statute by the Judicial Improvements and Access
to justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provided that "[a] corporation may be sued in any
judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue pur-
poses." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). In contrast, fol-
lowing the 1988 amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provides that "[flor purposes of venue
under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982)). The amendment of the gen-
eral venue statute redefines the residence of corporate defendants to encompass any location
in which personal jurisdiction would attach. Id. Nevertheless, until the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion in VE Holding, authority remained split as to whether the redefinition of corporate de-
fendant residency applied to the restrictive patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Keller
& Nunnenkamp, supra, at 1190. The Federal Circuit in VE Holding held that the 1988 amend-
ment of the general venue statute changes the meaning of corporate residency for the patent
venue statute as well. VE Holding Corp. v.Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1578-
80, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1617-18 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cerl. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
At least in the context of patent infringement suits involving corporate litigants, the patent
venue statute no longer represents a more restrictive provision than the general venue stat-
ute. Although not considered by the Federal Circuit in VE Holding, the liberal construction of
the patent venue statute in other decisions has effectively eliminated any forum advantage
available through the use of declaratory judgment in patent litigation. No longer is it benefi-
264
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Ultimately, the patent owner and licensee in Lang failed to satisfy
the justiciability requirement mandated by the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act.149 The Federal Circuit strictly construed this require-
ment to find no substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.'50 The
court found the nine-month period between the initiation of the
lawsuit and the scheduled completion of the allegedly infringing
hull structure to be too remote to cause concern.' 5 ' Nevertheless,
the Lang decision firmly establishes the availability of the declaratory




Since its decision in Lang, the Federal Circuit has not confronted
litigation involving a declaratory judgment action brought by a pat-
ent owner.15 3 Further, only one such action has been reported by
the lower courts.15 4 Nonetheless, Lang is a meaningful addition to
patent law jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit has applied the same
cial for a party to institute a declaratoryjudgment action simply as a mechanism for avoiding a
restrictive venue statute in favor of a broad venue statute. After VE Holding, the patent venue
statute is as liberal as the general venue statute. These events, therefore, have eliminated
concerns raised by courts after Proler Steel over the use of declaratory judgment by patent
owners as a pretense for circumventing the restrictive patent venue statute.
149. Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820,
1822 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
150. Id. at 765, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822 (finding that Pacific Marine and Thompson
Metals had not distributed sales literature, prepared to solicit orders, or engaged in any other
activity to indicate that ship would soon be ready for sea). Similar to the courts' analyses in
declaratory judgment actions by alleged infringers, the Federal Circuit's analysis in Lang em-
phasized the significance of solicitation of customer orders to a finding of an actual contro-
versy. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting solicitation of customer orders as
important criterion in justiciability determination).
151. Lang, 895 F.2d at 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822.
152. The holding of the Federal Circuit decision in Lang is controlling precedent in all
future cases of patent litigation. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from all United States district courts in cases where jurisdiction originated, in whole or in
part, under the federal patent law, 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988).
153. The low number of declaratory judgment actions brought by patent owners at the
district court level and absence of related appeals to the Federal Circuit may be due to the fact
that the implications of the Federal Circuit's decision in Lang have only recently been recog-
nized by intellectual property attorneys. Interview with Jerry D. Voight, partner, Finnegan,
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 23, 1991).
154. See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1289-90, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1422, 1437-38 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (reporting on patent owner seeking declaratory judg-
ment against prospective infringement by defendant's development of implantable defibril-
lator). The court in Intermedics held that the defendant's activities fell into the clinical trial
exemption to patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which exempts activity rea-
sonably related to the development and submission of information under federal laws regulat-
ing the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. Id at 1281-89, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430-37.
The court also held that the application of this exemption precluded the granting of declara-
tory relief, because no actual basis existed for concluding that a controversy would ever arise
to circumscribe the exemption. Id. at 1289-90, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437. The court
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two-prong test for justiciability set forth in Lang to declaratory judg-
ment actions brought by alleged infringers. 155 Moreover, both the
Federal Circuit and the district courts have cited Lang in dicta, sug-
gesting declaratory judgment as an alternate remedy to patent
owner plaintiffs who could not maintain suits brought under 35
U.S.C. § 271 because the defendants' activities did not amount to
actual infringement. 156
The Federal Circuit has indicated that Lang does not expand the
meaning of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 157 The court
will consider a declaratory judgment action brought by a patent
owner against prospective infringement under a different analytical
framework than an infringement action brought under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a).158 Whereas infringement under section 271(a) requires
actual commission of an infringing act, 159 prospective infringement
under a declaratory judgment action requires only that a defendant
be engaged in an activity directed toward making, selling, or using
failed to consider the propriety of declaratory judgment action brought by a patent owner,
however.
155. See Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634, 19 U.S.P.QJ2d (BNA)
1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir.) (litigating declaratory action sought by alleged infringer of fluorescent
leak detection additive used in automotive air conditioning systems), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
658 (1991). The court in Spectronics held that the manufacturer must have actually produced
or prepared to produce the allegedly infringing product, and that the patent owner's conduct
must create objectively reasonable apprehension on the part of the accused infringer that the
patent holder will initiate suit if the allegedly infringing activity continues. Id. at 634, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. This determination of actual controversy analysis is the same two-
prongjusticiability test set forth in Lang to ensure that the controversy is real and substantial.
Cf supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (describing two-prongjusticiability test used in
Lang).
156. See Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 919 F.2d 1579, 1582, 16 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1929, 1931 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (vacating district court judgment in infringement action
brought by patent owner because of nonexistence of accused product and citing Lang in ad-
monishing parties for failure to address question of court's jurisdiction over suit for infringe-
ment in absence of accused product); Quantum Corp. v. Sony Corp., 16 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA)
1447, 1450-51 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (following Lang and granting patent owner's motion to amend
complaint to state claim for declaratory relief where defendant's activities did not constitute
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271).
157. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 915 F.2d 670, 673, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2020,
2023 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that "[a] threat of sale does not constitute an act of infringe-
ment" under reasoning in Lang).
158. See Taylor-Winfield Corp. v. Clecim, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1254, 1254 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (deciding infringement action brought by patent owner against manufacturer of
line welding machine). The patent owner argued that the defendant's contract to build a
machine that would infringe upon completion amounted to a "sale" of an infringing device
within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). lId The patent owner further argued that because
declaratory judgment actions for prospective infringement do not require actual construction
of the infringing device, patent owners should not have to wait until the infringing device has
been built. Idl at 1255. The Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner's arguments, empha-
sizing that an infringement claim brought under § 271(a) requires actual injury and, there-
fore, is possible only after the infringing device has been constructed. Id. The Federal Circuit
was not prepared to consider expansion of the standard under § 271 (a). Id.
159. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988) (stating that "whoever without authority makes, uses,
or sells any patented invention .. . infringes the patent").
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the patented invention that is subject to an infringement charge
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).160 Thus, a party can only bring a charge
of prospective infringement through an action for declaratory judg-
ment. Expansion of intellectual property protection is apparent in
this context because declaratory judgment allows patent owners to
seek relief in situations where no remedy was previously available
under existing patent statutes. Recognition of the implications of
the Federal Circuit's decision in Lang has the potential for signifi-
cant impact on competitive business practices.
D. Discussion
The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is optimally
achieved in the context of patent infringement litigation. 6 1 Declar-
atory relief provides a quick and efficient means of resolving patent
infringement disputes in which millions of dollars are frequently at
stake.162 In addition, with today's volatile markets, the option of
preemptive adjudication provides patent owners with significant
economic bargaining power as well as practical financial security.'
63
160. Id.; see Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1820, 1822 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding meaningful preparation may constitute infringing activity
in declaratory judgment action by patent owner).
161. Notwithstanding its general utility in reducing economic costs, declaratory judgment
when specifically applied to patent law helps accomplish yet another goal. Adjudication of
rights and obligations among patent owners can provide a clearer understanding to others of
directions yet untried. The opportunity for early and efficient adjudication helps prevent du-
plicity in effort and facilitates progress. The availability of declaratory judgment to patent
owners and manufacturers, therefore, provides a unique social benefit.
162. In addition to the financial liabilities involved, the cost of patent infringement litiga-
tion itself can be staggering. See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1991 28-29 (1991) (reporting median cost of patent litigation in Washing-
ton, D.C. area as $204,000 from initiation of suit through discovery and as $450,000 from
discovery through completion of trial); McCarroll, supra note 42, at 45 (describing soaring
cost of such litigation as ranging as high as $250,000 to $2 million). These financial realities
make declaratory judgment, which is an efficient yet relatively inexpensive means of dispute
resolution, even more attractive to patent owners. Rapidly changing markets coupled with
high financial stakes illustrate the urgency of timely decisions. The early adjudication of con-
troversies by declaratory judgment is a means of achieving this end.
163. The Federal Circuit's decision in Lang makes it possible for patent owners to assert
their patent rights over a wider range of activities than was possible in the past. While patent
owners have always been able to influence the economy by marketing their innovations, now,
using declaratory judgment, they may be able to extend their influence over competitive busi-
ness to affect activities that have only a likelihood of prospective infringement. See Sobel,
supra note 21, at 1090 (stating that Federal Circuit decisions have profound effects not only in
patent infringement litigation, but also in design of new products and in licensing negotia-
tions). With its incredible profit potential, intellectual property is likely to continue to in-
crease its presence as a valuable commodity. Courts must now exercise sound discretion in
granting declaratory judgment to avoid the use of this procedural remedy by patent owners as
an offensive weapon against legitimate competitive enterprise. See PRACTICING LAw INST.,
PATENT LITIGATION 1988 14 (Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Hand-
book Series No. 258, 1988) (recognizing patent owners' objective to maintain competitive
position in marketplace).
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Prior to Lang, judicial sentiment held that procedures and reme-
dies such as declaratory judgment were inappropriate in the context
of patent law if their application strengthened patent rights. 164
Through its decision in Lang, the Federal Circuit effectively repudi-
ated this view in favor of broadening the scope of patent rights.1 65
The legal analyses in decisions prior to Lang failed to focus on the
utility of applying declaratory judgment in new contexts,' 66 but the
magnitude of financial liability in patent infringement litigation
mandates making available any remedy designed to bring about
quick and efficient resolution of disputes.' 67
Unfortunately, courts that criticized the use of declaratory judg-
ment by patent owners became entangled in policy concerns over
the strengthening of patent rights. 68 The fact that these courts
might have addressed issues concerning declaratory judgment use
by patent owners as mere pretexts for a general refusal to
strengthen patent rights cannot, however, diminish the import of
such policy concerns. 169 Patent law is inherently a delicate balance
of economic and social concerns, which have changed since the time
of Proler Steel.' 70 Public awareness of the United States' declining
status in the world marketplace as a result of intense foreign eco-
nomic and technological competition has prompted calls for gov-
ernment action.' 71 In response, a concerted effort by the executive,
164. The Swedlow rationale for denying declaratory judgment relief to patent owners sug-
gests judicial bias against increased patent protection. The reasons elaborated for rejecting
declaratory judgment use contravene the statutory intent of declaratory judgment and may
have been pretexts for a judicial agenda determined to restrict patent rights. See supra notes
111-17 and accompanying text (pointing out strong judicial reluctance to grant additional
remedy to patent owners).
165. See supra notes 122-52 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit's rejection
in Lang of rationale against making declaratory judgment remedy available to patent owners).
166. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text (discussing leading considerations of
courts denying availability of declaratory judgment remedy to patent owners).
167. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing recent infringement awards of
$500,000 to $900 million); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text (providing costs of
patent infringement litigation).
168. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text (discussing courts' concerns over ren-
dering advisory opinions, availability of express statutory remedy for infringement, and con-
flict with restrictive patent venue statute).
169. The Swedlow analysis fails to appreciate the broad utility of applying declaratory judg-
ment to suits by patent owners and instead depends on the underlying policy rationale against
strengthening patent rights. While economic and social concerns may have justified that ra-
tionale, the vision of the patent system has changed dramatically in the last decade, making
the policy rationale in earlier cases anachronistic.
170. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text (reviewing changes in patent law in
response to changes in world economy).
171. See Robert J. Samuelson, Kiss No. I Goodbye, Folks; America Must Now Stnggle in the
Global Economy, WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 1988, at C1 (discussing President's need to respond to
public's attitudes in forming economic foreign policy). The American people "yearn to recap-
ture past economic glory and to insulate themselves from foreign economic threats." Id. The
government response to rising economic nationalism, however, must occur with delicate for-
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legislative, and judicial branches of the United States Government
toward increasing intellectual property protection is now
underway.
17 2
The role of the Federal Circuit in advancing this trend to increase
the scope of patent rights should not be underestimated.17 3 As the
status of American technology in the world marketplace declines,
hesitation over providing patent owners with strengthened patent
rights continues to evaporate.17 4 The Federal Circuit's decision in
Lang is representative of the judicial trend arising in recognition of
intellectual property's importance to the economic well-being of the
United States.
175
The balance has tipped dramatically away from antitrust concerns
over patent grants toward a recognition of the economic necessity of
harnessing and safeguarding this country's vast creative resources
through strong patent protection. 176 Through its interpretation of
the patent laws, the Federal Circuit has complemented legislative
and executive branch action to encourage investment in innovation.
Judicial decisions such as Lang demonstrate that the patent system is
capable of guaranteeing the opportunity for a reward on such
eign diplomacy, taking into account the increasing global economic interdependence of the
United States. Id
172. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (relating efforts by each branch of United
States Government to strengthen patent rights).
173. See The Ninth AnnualJudicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, 94 F.R.D. 350, 358 (1982) (reporting remarks of Representative Robert W.
Kastenmeier that Federal Circuit had ability to "foster technological growth and industrial
innovation"). Application of declaratoryjudgment to suits by patent owners against prospec-
tive infringers is one such approach toward increasing intellectual property protection. The
Federal Circuit's decision in Lang enables patent owners to "reach forward in time" by al-
lowing them to prevent activity today that may infringe in the future. Alternatively, however,
the Federal Circuit could expand patent rights by construing more liberally the definition of
infringement to include activity highly likely to culminate in infringement, such as experimen-
tation. This extension, however, may be too transparent an attempt directed at increasing
intellectual property protection. See Taylor-Winfield Corp. v. Clecim, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1254, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting expansion of definition of infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) to include activity prior to actual construction of infringing device); Roche
Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937, 941
(Fed. Cir.) (rejecting contention that alleged infringer's drug production activity was for ex-
perimental rather than commercial purposes), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
174. See Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 27 (expressing lack of surprise that Federal Circuit has
aligned its interpretation of patent laws to realities of current economic climate); supra note 47
and accompanying text (discussing governmental response to call for improved United States
global economic competitiveness as including emphasis on increasing patent protection).
175. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text (recognizing Lang decision as part of
judicial trend that in turn is part of concerted governmental effort toward increasing intellec-
tual property protection in United States).
176. Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, whose House Judiciary subcommittee plays
a pivotal role in intellectual property legislation, stated that his group is under pressure to
create new property rights but is wary of the "danger in giving too much leverage to one
side." Dwyer, supra note 31, at 78.
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investments.177
CONCLUSION
Declaratory judgment use by patent owners increases the scope of
infringement liability to include activity that may infringe in the fu-
ture. 178 Patent owners now have the ability to reach farther to pre-
vent activity that has a likelihood of future infringement.1 79 The
extent of this reach will become more apparent as courts confront
cases that are dependent on the construction of the declaratory
judgment requirement of justiciability.180 Given the judicial trend
toward increased patent protection, one would expect to observe
increasingly liberal interpretations by courts of the actual contro-
versy requirement.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply
Co. 181 clearly broadens the scope of patent rights by establishing the
use of declaratory judgment by a patent owner as a preemptive mea-
sure against potential future infringers.' 8 2 This decision repudiates
as anachronistic a judicial sentiment adverse to strengthening pat-
ent rights.' 83 Although the court in Lang denied declaratory relief
to the patent owner and licensee on a strict construction of the ac-
tual controversy requirement, the court opened the door to the pos-
sibility of more liberal constructions. A more liberal interpretation
of this requirement would allow patent owners to reach farther than
ever before in protecting their patent rights.
The rationale for the patent system inherently balances the inter-
ests of the public in obtaining the widest possible dissemination of
177. Favorable public perception of the effectiveness of patent protection encourages in-
vestment in innovation. See McCarroll, supra note 42, at 45 (discussing relationship between
increased confidence in value and security of intellectual property and increase in patent fil-
ings and copyright registrations). Concurrent with government efforts toward increased pat-
ent protection between 1985 and 1990, there was a 397 increase in patent filings before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. l
178. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (asserting that declaratory judgment allows
patent owners to assert their patents over wider range of competitive activity).
179. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (emphasizing effect of increased patent
protection on market).
180. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (referring to strict construction ofjus-
ticiability taken by Federal Circuit in Lang).
181. See supra notes 121-52 and accompanying text (analyzing Lang in detail).
182. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing consequences of Lang in per-
mitting patent owners to wield patent rights over broader variety of business activities).
183. Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820,
1822 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting arguments that alleged infringer might alter its course of
conduct and that patent owner already possesses express statutory remedy for infringement);
see supra note 47 and accompanying text (asserting that judicial viewpoint has changed in re-
sponse to contemporary economic and social realities to favor increased intellectual property
protection).
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new technologies against the interests of private inventors and their
supporters in obtaining fair return on investments. The financial
incentive of the patent system is justified only to the extent that it
furthers patent law's public policy premise. The modern trend to-
ward aggressive enforcement of patent rights signals that the patent
system will be used as a tool to help revitalize the economic and
technological status of the United States in the world market. Yet,
using intellectual property protection as a means to encourage fi-
nancial investment inevitably compromises the fundamental policy
basis for according intellectual property rights in the first place.
In summary, the United States Government has clearly deter-
mined that increased intellectual property protection is vital to re-
taining economic bargaining power in the global marketplace.
Decisions such as Lang reflect a continuation along the path of an
arguably conscious journey by the Federal Circuit toward increased
patent protection. Despite concern among some legislators that the
patent balance has tipped too far toward favoring patent owners,
184
the present economic and social conditions in the United States do
not suggest that this trend will change course in the near future.
184. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (mentioning legislative awareness of bal-
ance between strong patent protections and antitrust concerns).

